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Abstract 
While life-cycle theory makes the clear prediction that people dissave at old-age, this prediction is 
not at all borne out by the data from many countries. Various suggestions have been made to explain 
this  discrepancy.  This  paper  sheds  more  light  on  the  effect  of  the  exclusion  of  institutionalized 
individuals in estimating saving rates over old-age, a conceptual aspect often mentioned but never 
investigated. Particularly this group is expected to decumulate wealth since nursing home expenses 
net of private (and public) insurance exceed disposable income on average.  
This  paper  uses  the  Health  and  Retirement  Study  (HRS)  for  the  USA  and  the  Income  and 
Expenditure Survey (EVS) for Germany to show that there is an increasing overestimation of saving 
rates from age 75 on if institutionalized households are not included.  
In the USA, the overestimation of the mean (median) saving rates is 3.3 percentage points (4.3pp) 
at age 80, 5.4pp (9.4pp) at age 90 and even more for age 90+. The overestimation of the German 
mean saving rate increases to almost 6pp at age 90. This strong overestimation is based on the fact 
that  nursing  home  residents  strongly  reduce  their  wealth  holdings.  Referring  to  the  USA,  the 
representative median single nursing home resident reduces wealth holdings by 90% over a two-year 
period; the representative mean single nursing home resident diminishes total net wealth by 19%. The 
dissaving is less strong for couples.  
The ongoing aging of industrialized populations and the connected increase in the fraction of the 
nursing home population will strengthen the importance of including the nursing home population to 
estimate aggregate saving rates in micro empirical studies. 
 
Keywords: nursing home population, saving, wealth, saving rate, saving puzzle, life-cycle models, 
elderly, age structure of the population 
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1  Introduction 
As suggested by the life-cycle–permanent income model (LCH-PIH model) developed by Modiglia-
ni and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957), individuals should reduce their overall wealth holdings 
particularly during retirement to smooth consumption over their life-cycle. Empirical evidence (“In-
ternational Saving Comparison Project”; Börsch-Supan et al., 2003) questions, at least in some coun-
tries, the prediction of dissaving at older ages since saving rates remain positive well beyond retire-
ment. They find little evidence of wealth decumulation in old-age in Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, the U.K., and the USA, but they do find dissaving by retired individuals in Japan. New 
evidence (Horioka, 2009) finds even stronger dissaving for Japan. Making use of USA panel data, 
Hurd (1987) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) provide evidence for a reduction of wealth holdings for 
retired Americans.  
Many suggestions were made to find an explanation for these empirical facts.
2 Authors of former 
studies argued that the inclusion of institutionalized elderly would not lead to a significant change in 
the results (e.g. Fall et al., 2001, p. 162). They are right when the population of interest is relatively 
young: the maximum age in the studies of the “International Saving Comparison Project” was 85 
years, in most studies even below. I show however that leaving out institutionalized elderly leads to a 
serious overestimation of the saving rate of the oldest old (75+) in the USA and Germany, since the 
institutionalized become increasingly important with age and precisely those individuals in nursing 
homes realize very high and negative saving rates. Excluding institutionalized individuals as done in 
the vast majority of the studies, may produce an increasingly selective sample over age. 
The effect of the overestimation of saving rates by excluding institutionalized individuals is esti-
mated for both the USA and Germany, two countries which differ in their arrangement of long-term 
care in nursing homes.
3 Even though the support of nursing home residents is stronger via the public 
long-term care insurance in Germany, the results are comparable in magnitude between these two 
countries.  
This paper makes use of a well-established American dataset, the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS).
4 The dataset is set up in a way that individuals who move to a nursing home are sampled 
again. In addition, the dataset provides detailed information about wealth and other important char-
acteristics. The paper has two main objectives:  
                                                           
2 Some of them are briefly discussed in section 3. 
3 See subsection 4.2 and 7.1.2 for more details.  
4 The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant number NIA 
U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan.   
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1.  I quantify the decrease of wealth holdings of institutionalized individuals using two different 
methods.  
The costs of living in a nursing home with its time intensive care for elderly people exceed public 
pensions as well as public or private insurance on average (see Merlis, 2003, pp. 22-27) for the USA. 
Thus, private savings are necessary to fill the gap between disposable income and nursing home 
costs. Nursing home residents will decrease their wealth faster compared to non-institutionalized 
individuals. 
2.  Based on these findings, I calculate the overestimation of saving rates at older ages if institu-
tionalized individuals are not included in the sample.  
The second objective is achieved by estimating saving rates using two different samples: the first 
one excludes the nursing home population, who are strongly dissaving (uncorrected saving rate); the 
second one includes nursing home residents (corrected saving rate). Comparing saving rates between 
these two samples allows estimating whether or not the exclusion of nursing home residents makes 
a difference in aggregate saving rates in old-age.  
Evidence based on the HRS suggests that nursing home residents are key components in under-
standing  the  saving  behavior  in  old-age.  Depending  on  how  the  dissaving  is  measured  (ratio  of 
means, ratio of medians, median of individual changes)
5, it takes between 2 and 11 years for a repre-
sentative single nursing home resident to eat up all his or her wealth in the USA. Couples, who have 
at least one nursing home resident, dissave less strongly. The strong dissaving is at least party re-
sponsible
6 why 44% [35%] of all nursing home expenses have to be financed by Medicaid in 1996 
[2004] (Rhoades and Sommers, 2000; CBO, 2004), which supports individuals and families who can-
not afford living in a nursing home anymore. Since the nursing home population almost increases 
exponentially with age and reaches more than 30% around age 95 for the USA, leaving out nursing 
home residents leads to a serious overestimation of the aggregate saving rates in old-age. According 
to my estimates, not including the institutionalized households results in an overestimation of the 
mean (median) saving rates by 3.3pp (4.3pp) at age 80, 5.4pp (9.4pp) at age 90 and even more for 
age 90+.  
Germany, which is one of the countries with the highest positive saving rates in old-age, is ana-
lyzed to compare the results obtained from the USA. A detailed calculation accounting for the Ger-
man  institutional  setting  is  accomplished  based  on  the  German  Income  and  Expenditure  Survey 
(EVS). Despite quite generous social long-term care contributions, the overestimation of the mean 
                                                           
5 See subsection 6.1 for further details.  
6 Another reason might be that individuals who anticipate entering a nursing home run down their wealth 
before they enter the nursing home.   
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saving rate increases to around 6pp at age 90. Therefore, the overestimation of saving rates is not 
restricted to the USA and is even comparable in its magnitude. 
The main contribution of this paper is to clarify the overestimation of aggregate saving rates of 
micro data by leaving out the fraction of the population that strongly dissaves.
7 As presented in sec-
tion 2, micro data show at most zero or small positive saving rates in old-age for most of the coun-
tries. The paper stresses the importance of including the institutionalized population when conduct-
ing empirical investigations about life-cycle saving behavior. The number of U.S. resident population 
over the age of 85 is estimated to be around 5.6 million on July, 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau, Popula-
tion Division, 2010). For individuals 85 and older long-term care in nursing homes is quite prevalent.
8 
Based on projections the 85 year olds increase to over 20 million in 2050 (Oxford Analytica, 2007). 
Thus, the bias induced on aggregate saving rates by excluding the institutionalized population will 
increase over time.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 summarizes the empirical evidence of saving rates 
and wealth decumulation of elderly individuals in different countries. This section reviews the da-
tasets on which the literature has been based, and whether or not the nursing home population was 
included. Section 3 provides an overview of approaches from statistics and economics to solve the 
“saving puzzle” of the elderly. An overview of the institutional backgrounds related to long-term care 
and how long-term care is financed in the USA is given in section 4. The dataset used in the analysis is 
described in section 5, and descriptive statistics about the nursing home population are introduced. 
The results are presented in section 6. Section 7 provides a calculation to quantify the bias of German 
saving rates at older ages. Section 8 concludes. 
 
                                                           
7 This could reduce saving rates in old-age in a way that the saving rates might be plausible from a perspective 
of  an  extended  life-cycle  model,  which  includes  health  and  long-term  care  payments  and  risk  in  the 
optimization problem (a brief discussion of these models can be found in section 3). 
8 See figure 1 in subsection 4.1.  
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2  Empirical evidence on the saving rate of the elderly 
Table 1 displays empirical evidence about the saving behavior of the elderly in different coun-
tries.
9 Appendix 1 outlines different concepts to measure saving and summarizes briefly their ad-
vantages and disadvantages.  
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9 The table has no claim to be complete. It should rather give an impression about the literature.  
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As can be seen, most of the studies rely on pseudo panel data. In most of these studies the evi-
dence about dissaving in old-age is weak. In Italy, the residual saving rate measure declines with age 
but remains positive. In France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the U.K. the residual saving rate ac-
tually does not decline with age. Only in the case of Japan and the USA (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010), 
residual saving becomes negative in old-age. Evidence based on changes in wealth differs from the 
residual measure in some countries. Especially in the Netherlands, Italy, and the USA, wealth hold-
ings decline with age. The evidence on wealth changes in these countries is based on real panel data. 
Hurd (1990, pp. 582-584, 611-614) shows clearly the bias of inference based on cross-sectional data 
due to differential mortality and emphasizes the importance of long panel data. Thus, measurement 
error related to the two saving measures as well as differential mortality might explain the different 
results related to the validity of the life-cycle model in old-age.   
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In all the datasets introduced above with only one exception (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010), insti-
tutionalized individuals are not covered in the sample and the maximum age included in the studies 
is at most 85 years. Before discussing the institutional background of long-term care, the financing of 
long-term care, and the fraction of nursing home residents over age in the USA, section 3 discusses 
possible solutions to the empirical puzzle presented in section 2.  
 
3  Possible explanations for the puzzle of still positive saving 
rates at older ages  
Many suggestions were made to find an explanation to these empirical facts. On the one side the 
empirical facts could be the results of other economic saving motives, e.g. the bequest motive (Hurd, 
1987, 1989) or the precautionary saving motive (Yaari, 1965; Palumbo, 1999), which can be included 
in the LCH-PIH model. A relatively new branch of literature incorporates health and long-term care 
payments and risk in the estimation of their structural life-cycle models, pointing out the relevance of 
long-term care expenses in understanding the saving behavior in old-age (Brown and Finkelstein, 
2008; De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2010; Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2010). All 
the models have in common that they model the intertemporal decision process of a retired single 
with heterogeneous life expectancy. The agent faces risky and heterogeneous medical expenditures 
including long-term care. The risk and the associated expenditures related to long-term care are sub-
stantial in all three models. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) estimate from the National Nursing Home 
Study and the longitudinal National Long Term Care Survey that the probabilities of ever using a nurs-
ing home are 27% for 65-year-old men and 44% for 65-year-old women. De Nardi, French, and Jones 
(2010)  calculate  mean  medical  out-of-pocket  expenses  over  age  and  income  quintiles  from  the 
AHEAD survey. Medical expenses sharply increase with age from less than $ 1,000 p.a. at age 75 to $ 
17,700 p.a. at age 100. At age 100, 72% of the medical expenses are nursing home costs. Marshall, 
McGarry, and Skinner (2010) estimate the distribution of out-of-pocket medical expenditures in the 
last year of life. Their average estimate is $ 11,618, the 90
th percentile has expenses of $ 29,335, and 
95
th percentile of $ 49,907.
10  
                                                           
10 The structural life-cycle models focus on different empirical facts they want to explain. Brown and Finkelstein 
(2008) explain the lack of private insurance purchases by the large crowd-out effect of Medicaid. Ameriks, Cap-
lin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) provide evidence that the lack of wealth decumulation in old-age is 
driven by public care aversion and a bequest motive, which is not only important for wealthy households but 
also for the middle class. De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) find that medical expenditures play an important 
role in explaining the saving behavior in old-age over different income groups.  
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Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) suggest that the low level of wealth decumulation in old-age is 
caused by the deteriorating health status of the elderly and the generous German pension system 
combined with the almost complete coverage of health expenses by the mandatory German health 
insurance. The deteriorating health status may prevent the elderly from spending more than their 
disposable income, and this leads to a deviation from optimal life-cycle behavior. 
On the other side statistical artifacts are an important part of the explanation. Saving behavior dif-
fers strongly depending on the political and economic conditions individuals grow up in. Among oth-
er studies, the “International Saving Comparison Project” (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003) showed how 
crucial it is to control cohort effects. Most studies rely on synthetic panel data to estimate the effect 
of age on the saving rate. As the poor face higher mortality rates, the wealth holdings of older co-
horts are biased upwards. Thus, in synthetic panels one has to take differential mortality into account 
(Shorrocks, 1975; Hurd, 1987, 1990; Jianakoplos et al., 1989; Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000). 
An additional explanation is related to an increasingly selective sample because nursing home res-
idents are not sampled in almost all studies introduced in section 2. Since the nursing home popula-
tion increases with age and is expected to strongly dissave, saving rates are overestimated. Before 
exploiting this aspect, the next section provides the institutional background of long-term care, se-
lected statistics, and information about the financing of long-term care in the USA. 
 
4  Long-term care in the USA: population characteristics and 
institutional background 
4.1  Resident characteristics   
The fraction of nursing home population increases strongly with age (figure 1). Only 1.25% of indi-
viduals aged 70 live in nursing homes. This fraction increases to 2.5% for individuals aged 75, 5% for 
those aged 80, 15% for those aged 85, and almost 30% for those aged 90. It seems that the percent-
age of nursing home residents doubles every 5 years from age 70 on.   
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Figure 1: Institutionalized population by age in the USA 
 
Source: Lakdawalla et al. (2003), Baseline Forecasts of Changes in Nursing Home Use, table 3, p. 15.  
 
Data from a nationally representative sample of nursing homes and nursing home residents from 
1996 (Nursing Home Component (NHC) of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)) show that 
more than two-thirds of the nursing home population in 1996 (71.6%) are women (Krauss and Alt-
man, 1998). Most of the residents are already widowed (59.8%). 16.6% of residents are married and 
14.4% have never been married. The remaining residents (9.2 %) are divorced or separated. Over 
time, resident characteristics have not change that much. Based on the 2004 National Nursing Home 
Survey, Jonas et al. (2009) report that 71.2% are female residents. 54.1% of the respondents are 
widowed, 20.5% are married or living with a partner, 15.1% are single or never married, and 10.3% 
are divorced or separated. 
 
4.2  How is long-term care financed? 
For all the individuals without the means of financing nursing home costs, the expenses of as-
sessed need are financed by Medicaid, the health program for individuals and families with low in-
comes and resources, which is jointly funded by the federal and state governments through general 
taxation. Since Medicaid is a means-tested payer of last resort, all individuals who can afford it have 
to pay long-term care expenses in institutions net of private insurance. If a household has more in-
come and assets than Medicaid allows, the household has to pay for long-term care until income and 
assets are at or below states poverty level.
 11 Medicaid is not limited to a certain time period as long 
                                                           
11 See Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein (2006, table A1) for Medicaid eligibility parameters by state in 2000.   
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as individuals meet the qualification based on need for care and financial need. The spouse of a Med-
icaid recipient is permitted to keep a low level of disposable income and certain assets, like the own-
ership of a home and a car, in order to avoid poverty.  Any amount above the level has to be spent 
for the institutionalized spouses’ care.
12 An additional source of financing long-term care is Medicare, 
a social insurance program, which is funded by the Federal government through social security con-
tributions. Medicare covers mainly short-term nursing home stays for people to recover from acute 
illness (OECD, 2005). Individuals have to be approved to get Medicare coverage for a nursing home 
stay: First, one has to have been in the hospital for at least three days prior to entering the nursing 
home. Second, skilled nursing must be needed. Custodial care, like help with activities of daily living 
such as eating, bathing and dressing, is not covered. Another payment source is the private long-
term care insurance. However, the ownership rates of such kind of insurance among individuals 60 
years and older is only around 10% (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007).
13  
In 1996 around $70 billion (0.9% of GDP) were spent on expenses for services in nursing homes on 
a national level (Rhoades and Sommers, 2000) compared to $135 billion (1.1% of GDP) in 2004 (CBO, 
2004). The aggregate long-term care expenditures have the following structures in 1996 and in 2004 
[in brackets]: 44% [35%] were financed by Medicaid, 30% [33%] were out-of-pocket expenditures 
paid from social security or pension income, other income, assets, or financial support of the family, 
19% [25%] were covered by Medicare, 4% [4%] by private insurance, and 3% [3%] by other sources 
(Department of Veterans Affairs, health maintenance organization contract, or other). Only 30% 
[33%] is financed by disposable income and wealth. The large fraction financed by Medicaid suggests 
that there are many individuals who never had enough income and/or wealth or who already decu-
mulated their wealth to finance their nursing home expenses.
14  
                                                           
12 A concern is that individuals hide assets from Medicaid or transfer assets to other households in order to 
protect resources for the individual and/or heirs. Medicaid eligibility rules impose penalties on individuals who 
give their assets away over a three- to five-year look-back period on assets prior to application (Stone, 2002).  
13 Merlis (2003) points out several reasons why individuals do not purchase private long-term care insurance 
despite they can afford it. Young individuals postpone the decision about private long-term care insurance 
since many of them face other and more urgent financial risks. In addition, the environment, personal and 
institutional circumstances can change until the nursing home stay becomes relevant. Savings might be the 
more flexible instrument. Older individuals are more likely to fail specified underwriting screens to be allowed 
to purchase long-term care insurance. Moreover, insurance premiums strongly increase with age, and a larger 
fraction of elderly might not be able to finance private long-term care insurance anymore. Brown and Finkel-
stein (2008) add that Medicaid crowds out the purchase of a private insurance for the bottom two-thirds of the 
wealth distribution. This is due to the fact that despite the limited coverage of Medicaid, Medicaid is means-
tested after taking private insurance into account.  
14 Despite the fact that Medicaid steps in as a means-tested payer of last resort, there are reasons why an 
individual  could  try  to  prevent  publicly-provided  long-term  care.  Ameriks,  Caplin,  Laufer,  and  Van 
Nieuwerburgh (2010) use the term public care aversion. Public care aversion could be the result of Medicaid’s 
restrictions in the choice of facility, quality differential between Medicaid-financed and privately financed care  
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5  Data 
5.1  Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
The HRS is a representative U.S. American panel survey of individuals aged 51 and above and their 
spouses. The empirical analysis is based on the RAND HRS Data.
15 This file is an easy-to-use dataset, 
which is already cleaned and edited across waves. I use the following waves to conduct my analysis: 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008.
16   
The wealth measure used is total net wealth (excluding secondary residence)
17, which is available 
in all the years named above. Wealth is inflation adjusted, and the base year is 2000. From 1996 for-
ward, some variables provide information about nursing home residence.
18 In the HRS
19 nursing 
homes are defined as: “Nursing homes are institutions primarily for people who need constant nurs-
ing supervision or are incapable of living independently. Nursing supervision must be provided on a 
continuous basis for the institution to qualify as a nursing home. Please don’t include stays in adult 
foster care facilities or other short-term stays in a hospital.”
20  
Respondents below 65 years are excluded because this paper focuses on the saving rates from 
age 65 on. Appendix 2 provides all details about the sample restriction. Tables and results in section 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
or perceived quality differences (Norton (2000) provides a review of the mixed empirical evidence), surrender 
of almost all income to the government, or feeling some stigma associated with Medicaid.  
15 The RAND HRS Data (Version J) uses Early Release data from the Health and Retirement Study in 2008, 
sponsored  by  the  National  Institute  on  Aging  (grant  number  NIA  U01AG009740)  and  conducted  by  the 
University of Michigan. These data have not been cleaned and may contain errors that will be corrected in the 
Final Public Release version of the dataset. All the other waves of the RAND HRS Data (Version J) are not Early 
Release data.  
16 I exclude all observations of wave 2 since assets were underreported in the 1994 (1993) wave of AHEAD 
(Rohwedder, Haider, and Hurd, 2004). 
17 The reason why the value of secondary residence is excluded is that the value of secondary residence is not 
available in wave 3. An overview of the asset categories included in the wealth measure used can be found in 
Appendix 4. 
18 The variable used indicates whether the respondent lives in a nursing home at the time of the interview. 
19 The definition is taken out the HRS questionnaires. The definition is the same over all wave from 1996 to 
2008.   
20 This corresponds quite closely to a definition of Gilberg (2000, pp. 59-60) and Ribbe et al. (1997, pp. 5-7): “A 
nursing home is an institution for elderly people who are not able to independently take care of their household 
any  more.  The  nursing  home  provides  room,  food  and  assistance  (e.g.  cleaning  of  rooms  and  clothes).  In 
addition,  nursing  homes  are  institutions  providing  nursing  care  24h  a  day  for  all  residents  necessary.  This 
includes assistance with activities of daily living and mobility, psychosocial and personal care, paramedical care, 
such as physiotherapy and occupational therapy.”  
Nursing homes have to be separated from residential homes, which are not the focus of this study and are 
defined as follows: “Residential homes for the elderly (or homes for the aged) are institutions for elderly who 
are still able to independently keep their house. They provide living conditions adjusted to the needs of their 
elderly residents. The resident requires no more nursing care than given by a visiting nurse. Ambulatory services 
are provided by some of the residential homes.”   
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5 and 6 are weighted if not stated otherwise. Appendix 3 informs about the weights and how they 
are constructed.
21 The accurate measurement of wealth is crucial for this analysis. A justified concern 
is that nursing home residents are less informed about their wealth holdings due to cognitive re-
strictions they might face in their condition. One would expect that more wealth categories have to 
be imputed for nursing home residents. Appendix 4 provides details about item-nonresponse for 
each wealth category necessary to construct total net wealth (excluding secondary residence). Over 
most of the wealth categories institutionalized individuals have even lower missing rates.
22  
Table 2 displays the sample size of respondents and the fraction of respondents currently living in 
a nursing home by different age groups. Over all years 2,872 observations of current nursing home 
residents are available. This reflects 3.8% of the sample of around 74,664 respondents. The second 
part of table 2 excludes non retired individuals, because their saving behavior differs from that of 
retired individuals.
23 The LCH-PIH model predicts negative saving rates for retired individuals, so 
many studies focus on these. In this study I focus on all individuals of age 65 and above because ag-
gregate saving rates over all individuals for each age should be calculated. Excluding non-retired indi-
viduals reduces the samples size especially for younger ages of non-institutionalized individuals (table 
2). The sample size for the institutionalized individuals remains almost unchanged (the difference is 
less than 1%).  
 
Table 2: Sample size – number of respondents by age group 
The National
# all # living in a  living in a nursing # all # living in a  living in a nursing Nursing Home
age respondents nursing home home in % of age group respondents nursing home home in % of age group Survey - 2004
65-69 20,993 138 0.7% 17,831 136 0.8%
70-74 18,178 223 1.2% 16,891 220 1.3%
75-79 14,905 348 2.3% 14,359 347 2.4%
80-84 10,844 556 5.1% 10,654 555 5.2%
85+ 9,744 1,607 16.5% 9,670 1,601 16.6% 14.4%
total 74,664 2,872 3.8% 69,405 2,859 4.1% 3.6%




Source: own calculations based on RAND HRS Data 1996-2008 (Version J); National Nursing Home Survey 2004 
(Jones et al., 2009, table 5). 
 
Whereas the number of all observation decreases with age (table 2), the number of nursing home 
residents increases for higher age groups. The percentage of nursing home residents based on the 
                                                           
21  The  unweighted  results  differ  only  slightly  from  the  weighted  results  presented  in  this  paper.  The 
unweighted results are available upon request.  
22 One reason for this might be that proxies (relatives like children) are better informed about the wealth 
holdings of their parents. The number of proxy interviews increases from 7% at age 65, to 11% at age 80, to 
23% at age 90, to 46% at age 95 and above.  
23 Excluding non-retired individuals does not change the evidence in section 6.  
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National Nursing Home Survey (NNHS) in 2004 (Jones et al., 2009) is relatively similar to the HRS. 
Whereas the difference for the oldest age group is significantly larger in the HRS compared to the 
NNHS, for age groups 65-74 and 75-84 no significant difference is observed. The gender composition 
(table 3) in nursing homes, household composition (table 4), and race (table 5) almost exactly mirrors 
the National Nursing Home Survey of 2004. 
 
Table 3: Nursing home residence by gender 
not living in a  National Nursing 
gender institutionalized nursing home total Home Survey - 2004*
male  42% 26% 42% 26%
female 58% 74% 58% 74%
total 100% 100% 100% 100%  
Source: own calculations based on RAND HRS Data 1996-2008 (Version J); weighted. *Restricted to age 65 and 
above. 
 
Table 4: Nursing home residence by household composition 
 not  living in a  National Nursing 
couple institutionalized nursing home total Home Survey - 2004*
no 43% 83% 45% 80%
yes 57% 17% 55% 20%
total 100% 100% 100% 100%  
Source: own calculations based on RAND HRS Data 1996-2008 (Version J); weighted. *Over all age groups. 
 
Table 5: Nursing home residence by race 
 not  living in a  National Nursing 
race institutionalized nursing home total Home Survey - 2004*
white 89% 89% 89% 87%
black 8% 9% 8% 11%
other** 3% 2% 3% 2%
total 100% 100% 100% 100%  
Source: own calculations based on RAND HRS Data 1996-2008 (Version J); weighted. *Restricted to age 65 and 
above. **Includes Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaska Native, and mul-
tiple races. 
 
5.2  Calculation of changes in wealth 
In this study, two-year changes in wealth are calculated by comparing the asset holdings at the 
beginning and the end of the two-year period. If this difference is divided by disposable income, the 
saving rate will be calculated according to method one in Appendix 1. Whereas in the case of the  
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HRS, saving could be additionally calculated applying the second method of Appendix 1, income mi-
nus consumption, I focus on saving based on differences in wealth. Besides the advantages and dis-
advantages of measuring wealth by the asset holdings at the beginning and the end of the two-year 
period, the sample size would be drastically reduced using the Consumption and Activities Mail Sur-
vey (CAMS). CAMS is only available for the years 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009. In addition, 
spending was only assessed for a large random subset of the HRS and the response rates were be-
tween 70-80%. Besides, unit-nonresponse in CAMS increases with age (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2006, 
p. 11).  Whereas wealth was consistently measured from 1996 to 2008, there were major changes in 
the design of the CAMS (especially between 2003 and 2005). Although the consumption measures of 
the CAMS are relatively close to the consumption measures in the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX) the difference between CAMS and CEX is larger at older ages (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2006, p. 
12; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2009, p. 445), which might be an underestimation of spending for older 
cohorts in the CEX.  
 
6  Results 
6.1  Methodology 
It is a difficult task to measure wealth. Even in cases where wealth is as carefully measured as in 
the HRS, measurement error is a major concern. Since the saving behavior in old-age is calculated out 
of wealth holdings in different points in time, the statistical methods to draw conclusions from the 
data should not be prone to measurement error. The three measures of aggregate wealth changes 
adapted in this study are as follows (the same three measures are applied by Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2010)): 
1.  The first measure is the ratio of mean wealth of the population (or a subgroup) interviewed 





















w ,                (6.1) 
where t=1998, 2000, …, 2008 and h are the households observed in two adjacent waves.  
2.  The second measure is the ratio of median wealth of the population (or a subgroup) inter-












w                  (6.2) 
3.  The last measure is the median of households wealth ratios in two adjacent waves (called 




















-               (6.3) 
For the last measure, the household wealth ratios have to be corrected in cases where 
wh,t-2 is negative. The ratio must be multiplied by “-1” if wh,t-2 is negative. After this correction, 
the  households’  wealth  ratio  will  correctly  reflect  wealth  increases  and  decreases  over 
waves.  
The two median measures (“ratio of medians” and “median of individual changes”) are more ro-
bust against outliers. However, the “ratio of means” is the reference measure if one wants to com-
pare saving rates from micro empirical studies to aggregate statistics. The three measures of aggre-
gate wealth changes are calculated over the following two-year periods for the HRS: 1996-1998, 
1998-2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2006, and 2006-2008. Due to the different numbers of ob-
servations in each of these two-year periods, the ratios are additionally weighted by the number of 
observations in each time period. All the variables related to wealth changes such as age, current 
nursing home residence, etc. are taken from the end of the two-year period.
24 
 
6.2  Wealth decumulation of nursing home residents in the USA 
Nursing home residents are expected to strongly reduce their wealth holdings. But do they have 
sufficient wealth holdings to be decumulated? Figure 2 shows mean and median total net wealth of 
institutionalized households two years prior the current nursing home status. Mean total net wealth 
increases from $ 129,000 in 1998 to $ 158,000 in 2008 (base year 2000). Median total net wealth 
decreases $ 36,000 in 1998, to $ 12,000 in 2006, and increases again to $ 33,000 in 2008. Thus, a 
large fraction of institutionalized household has the ability to dissave. 
 
                                                           
24 Using the end of the two-year period relates the changes in wealth to all nursing home residents, even if the 
nursing home entry was only a short time before. Using the nursing home status at the beginning of the two-
year period drops important observations since the nursing home resident has to survive the next two years to 
measure his or her wealth again.   
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year
mean median
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008; weighted.
 
 
Table 6: Number of nursing home residents by singles and couples 
# of nursing home residents
0 1 2 total
single 23,975 2,001 0 25,976
couple 21,038 350 59 21,447
total 45,013 2,351 59 47,423  
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008.  
 
The sample is split according to singles and couples (table 6).
25 Overall, much more singles are ob-
served to be in a nursing home. Two reasons are responsible: first, older households are more likely 
to be single households due to the death of the spouse; second, for couples the probability of moving 
into a nursing home for an individual who needs care is reduced since the partner could provide care 
as long as he or she is able to. Overall, there are 59 households where both respondent and spouse 
are institutionalized, which is 14% of all couples with at least one institutionalized household mem-
ber. If only one member of a household is in a facility, different resources are needed compared to 
singles in nursing homes or couples with both members institutionalized.  
According to the three measures introduced in section 6.1, two-year wealth changes of the nurs-
ing  home  population  are  calculated.  Appendix  5  shows  the  stability  of  nursing  home  residents’ 
                                                           
25 The sample size is restricted to the years 1998-2008. This is necessary since the difference in wealth is 
calculated  over  a  two-year  period.  Since  wealth  of  1994  cannot  be  used  due  to  underreporting,  the  first 
available year is 1996. Thus, the first time the nursing home status can be used is 1998.   
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wealth changes over waves and age classes. At least for singles the measures are relatively stable. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that wealth dynamics over time and age are stable. Therefore, 
wealth changes are calculated over all waves and age classes.  
The ratio of means of the two-year percent change in wealth of singles is -19%, the ratio of medi-
ans is even -91%, and the ratio of individual changes is -32%. The ratio of means of the two-year per-
cent change in wealth of couples is -14%, the ratio of medians is -17%, and the ratio of individual 
changes is -9%.
26 To get a better understanding of wealth changes, wealth paths of a representative 
nursing home resident are displayed (figure 3). Wealth in the year before the individual moved into 
the nursing home is set to 100. The two-year ratios are divided by 2 to reflect one-year ratios. In ad-
dition, wealth changes are assumed to be constant in absolute terms over the time spent in a nursing 
home. This corresponds to the assumption that nursing home expenses do not change much in abso-
lute terms over time and income remains roughly constant.  
 
Figure 3: Simulated wealth paths based on fixed absolute nursing home expenses 
 
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008; weighted. 
 
For the ratio of medians, the representative single eats up its wealth almost completely in a two-
year period. It takes 7 years until wealth is completely decumulated if dissaving is measured via the 
median of individual changes and 11 years for the ratio of means. For a representative couple, the 
wealth reduction is not that large. Based on the ratio of medians measure, it takes less than 12 years 
until wealth is completely consumed. 15 or 23 years are needed for a complete wealth decumulation 
                                                           
26  The  results  presented  contain  individuals  both  covered  and  not  covered  by  Medicaid.  If  the  sample  is 
restricted to all singles or couples not covered by Medicaid prior to their actual nursing home status, almost no 
change is observed for couples. For singles the ratio of means remains roughly constant, whereas the ratio of 
medians increases to -75% and the median of individual changes decreases to -42%.   
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if the wealth change is measured by the median of individual changes or the ratio of means. The 
lower wealth decumulation of couples is explained by the fact that couples have higher disposable 
incomes on average. Thus, if only one member of the household lives in a nursing home, fewer sav-
ings must be provided to close the gap. 
The strong dissaving in nursing homes fits the official facts about the financing of nursing home 
expenses on a national level (see section 4.2). 35% of all the expenses in 2004 are financed by Medi-
caid. Medicaid supports individuals and families with low resources such as disposable income and 
wealth. If the median individual runs down his or her wealth after a bit more than two years, Medi-
caid has to take over.  
According to the National Nursing Home Survey in 2004 (Jones et al., 2009, p. 4),  the average 
length of time from admission to the nursing home until the date of the interview was 835 days 
compared to the median of 463 days. This leads to a complete wealth decumulation for a large frac-
tion of individuals. At least wealth holdings will be drastically reduced for most of the nursing home 
residents at the time of their death.  
 
How much is covered of average nursing home expenses by household income? 
The rest of this subsection looks at nursing home cost and total household income of HRS re-
spondents and tries to answer the following questions: How large is the fraction of average nursing 
home expenses that can be financed by households’ disposable income? Taking the wealth holdings 
as given, how long does it take for a nursing home resident until wealth is used up completely? This 
calculation can be seen as another possibility to calculate wealth decumulation of nursing home resi-
dents and should be considered as a robustness test of the results presented above.  
The analysis is restricted to the three waves 2004, 2006, and 2008. Only for these years, average 
nursing home expenses are available from the Genworth Financial Cost of Care Survey. The inflation 
adjusted U.S. average costs (base year 2000) of a private and semi-private room are shown in table 
7.
27 In 2006, the average costs for a private room are $ 60,571 and $ 53,413 for a semi-private room 
respectively. The other columns present the mean and different quantiles of total household income 
of HRS respondents. To maintain comparability the sample is restricted to only households of re-
spondents above 65. The sample is weighted according to the usual HRS household weights. For sin-
gles living alone, the median total household income is $ 14,982, and the mean is $ 31,529 over all 
                                                           
27 The median of U.S. nursing home cost is only shown in the Genworth Financial Cost of Care Surveys of 2009 
and 2010.   
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three waves. A couple living alone has a median total household income of $ 37,032 and an average 
total household income of $ 56,248 over the same time period.  
Table 8 displays the fraction of nursing home costs that can be financed if total household income 
is only used to pay nursing home expenses (semi-private room). I refer to the numbers over all three 
waves. The median income of the category singles is only able to cover 28% of average expenses. For 
the mean it increases to 59%. In the case of couples, median income pays for 69% and mean income 
for 105% of nursing home expenses. This is in line with the findings above (figure 3). Wealth decumu-
lation is faster for singles compared to couples as well as for median compared to mean income re-
cipients.  
 
Table 7: Nursing home costs and total household income 
private room semi-private room
year mean mean mean p25 p50 p75 p90 mean p25 p50 p75 p90
2004 59,422 52,575 23,965 9,517 14,881 25,397 42,619 56,422 23,307 36,591 59,545 100,458
2006 60,571 53,413 27,822 9,584 14,929 25,855 43,744 53,626 23,575 36,511 61,141 102,482
2008 61,153 54,713 42,427 9,574 15,107 26,950 47,726 58,647 24,122 38,199 64,587 112,574
total 60,380 53,569 31,529 9,553 14,982 26,086 44,384 56,248 23,722 37,032 61,435 105,795
nursing home costs total household income
singles couples
 
Source: Genworth Financial Cost of Care Survey 2006, 2007, and 2008. Own calculation based on the HRS 2004-
2008; weighted.  
 
Table 8: Total household income as a fraction of nursing home costs 
year mean p25 p50 p75 p90 mean p25 p50 p75 p90
2004 46% 18% 28% 48% 81% 107% 44% 70% 113% 191%
2006 52% 18% 28% 48% 82% 100% 44% 68% 114% 192%
2008 78% 17% 28% 49% 87% 107% 44% 70% 118% 206%
total 59% 18% 28% 49% 83% 105% 44% 69% 115% 197%
couples singles
 
Source: Genworth Financial Cost of Care Survey 2006, 2007, and 2008. Own calculation based on the HRS 2004-
2008; weighted.  
 
Table 9: Distribution of total net wealth (excluding secondary residence) 
year mean p25 p50 p75 p90 mean p25 p50 p75 p90
2004 233,040 13,674 85,234 253,423 580,778 562,525 103,922 265,729 580,248 1,188,717
2006 282,204 10,421 90,969 281,875 629,521 649,425 111,896 284,096 627,813 1,225,730
2008 282,969 9,598 87,978 277,772 610,490 606,733 105,414 283,930 627,845 1,231,697
total 265,941 11,121 88,042 269,917 605,298 605,794 106,856 275,896 615,688 1,211,507
singles couples
 
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 2004-2008; weighted. 
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To facilitate the subsequent calculation, I assume that the mean income household has mean 
wealth and the median income household has median wealth. This approximation is appropriate as 
long as the correlation between retirement income and wealth is sufficiently strong.
28 Median wealth 
for singles (couples) is $ 88,042 ($ 275,896), and mean wealth is $ 265,941 ($ 605,794) (table 9). 
 
Figure 4: Simulated wealth paths based on wealth minus net nursing home expenses 
   
Source: Genworth Financial Cost of Care Survey 2006, 2007, and 2008. Own calculation based on the HRS 2004-
2008; weighted.  
 
The results (figure 4) are remarkably close to the wealth decumulation measures displayed in fig-
ure 3 for singles. In both cases, wealth is completely consumed after a bit more than 2 years for the 
representative median household (ratio of median). If both calculations are based on the mean, the 
representative mean single has zero wealth around year eleven of the nursing home stay.  
The calculation based on wealth minus net nursing home expenses shows a slower wealth decu-
mulation for couples compared to figure 3. The main reason for this difference is the fact that only 
nursing home costs are considered. This might be an adequate assumption for single nursing home 
residents since almost all the expenses of daily living are part of nursing home costs. However, the 
                                                           
28 Another method is to assign the actual wealth holdings to the median or mean income household. However, 
this method is not robust against outliers. By chance the wealth holdings of the median income household(s) 
might be high or low. The higher the number of median income households, the less likely it is to obtain an 
outlier  with  regard  to  wealth.  Another  possibility  is  to  calculate  median  wealth  holdings  of  all  household 
between the 49
th and 51
st income percentile. A similar procedure can be done for the mean. Both yield very 
similar results compared to the procedure implemented.    
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spouse living outside the nursing home has to cover additional expenses such as rent, food or a car. 
This leads to an underestimation of the wealth decumulation for couples using the second method.
29  
To sum up, estimating the effect of wealth decumulation for single nursing home residents is very 
similar using two different methods. There are larger discrepancies for couples. This difference is 
mainly driven by expenses of the spouse outside the nursing home, which are not considered in the 
second calculation method. The results quantify the strong dissaving of the nursing home residents. 
Leaving them out of the sample might lead to a serious overestimation of the saving rate of elderly 
households.  
 
6.3  The overestimation of saving rates at older ages in the USA 
The previous section revealed that nursing home residents strongly dissave. In almost all of the 
datasets introduced in section 2, institutionalized individuals are not included in the sample. This 
raises the question, how large will be the effect on the aggregate saving rate if institutionalized indi-
viduals are excluded from the sample? To answer this question, mean and median saving rates are 
calculated for each age.  
1.  The mean aggregate saving rate is calculated as follows: 












s ,            (6.4) 
where k stands for each age from 65 to 95, t for the current period and t-2 for time of the 
wave before. Saving rates are calculated by using disposable income in the denominator. 
Since disposable income is only publically available for the years 2000 and 2002, total house-
hold income is taken, which includes all kinds of income sources before tax. Above age 75, 
taxes only play a minor role and the results change only slightly if disposable income is used 
                                                           
29 Other reasons for a discrepancy between the two calculation methods are that passive savings via capital 
gains or losses and receiving or leaving a inheritance are only included using differences in wealth holdings. In 
reference to that, inheritance from outside the household plays an inferior role for individuals aged 65 and 
above. Moreover, nursing home costs differ between individuals. Wealthier individuals might choose a more 
expensive long-term care facility. In addition, long-term care insurance reduces wealth decumulation. Over all 
respondents of age 65 and above, 11% report having a long-term care insurance, which covers at least a part of 
nursing home expenses.   
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for the years 2000 and 2002.
30 Total household income is taken from period t-1 since income 
is reported for the last calendar year before the interview.  
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age
number of observations fraction institutionalized
Source: Own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008.
 
 
One problem in calculating saving rates for the oldest old is the strong decrease of the number of 
observations with age. Although the HRS provides sample sizes of up to 20,000 respondents for each 
wave (Appendix 2), it is necessary to pool all waves from 1996-2008 to obtain a reasonable sample 
size. Figure 5 shows for each age the sample size and the fraction of institutionalized individuals. The 
sample size decreases from more than 4,500 observations at age 65 to less than 23 observations at 
                                                           
30 For a detailed description of the income measure see RAND HRS Data Documentation (Version J, pp. 708-
710). Rohwedder et al. (2005) provide a calculation of federal, state, and FICA taxes for HRS respondents in 
2000 and 2002. Based on their calculations two observations can be made: first, the median sum of federal, 
state, and FICA taxes is zero from age 74 on. With increasing age taxes become less and less important and the 
difference  between  disposable  income  and  total  income  closes  almost  completely.  Second,  the  key  result 
presented in figure 7 changes only slightly if median and mean saving rates are computed based on disposable 
income instead of total income in the denominator for the years 2000 and 2002. The maximum change of the 
difference between the median saving rates is 0.3pp. The maximum change of the difference between the 
mean saving rates is 0.4pp up to age 89. From age 90 to 95 the absolute change increases from 1pp to 4pp. 
However, the larger changes in percentage points for age 90+ are not more than 13% relative to the overall 
difference.   
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age 100. The following analysis is restricted to the age span 65 to 95 years since the number of ob-
servations drops from 160 at age 95 to less than 100 at age 96. The fraction of institutionalized indi-
viduals increases from less than 1% at age 65 to 4.5% at age 80 growing with almost exponential 
pace up to 32.2% at age 95.  
Appendix 6 shows scatter plots of the obtained saving rates and describes the smoothing of the 
saving rates by age. The smoothed mean and median saving rates by age and for two samples are 
shown in figure 6. The corrected sample includes institutionalized households while the uncorrected 
sample excludes them. 
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age
uncorrected mean SR corrected mean SR
uncorrected median SR corrected median SR
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008; weighted. SR = saving rate.
  
 
The uncorrected mean saving rate of non-institutionalized households declines from 8% at age 65 
to -26% at age 90, while it increases again from age 90 on. A similar trend can be observed for the 
uncorrected median saving rate of non-institutionalized households which declines from 14% at age 
65 to -42% at age 90 and then increases again from age 91 to 93.
32 When comparing the saving rates 
obtained including and excluding institutionalized households, almost no difference can be observed 
                                                           
31 No confidence intervals can be calculated if the mean and median saving rates are calculated as stated in 
equation (6.4) and (6.5). Only one saving rate is available for each age. Variation is available if the mean or 
median of individual saving rates are calculated. However, those are unweighted not comparable to aggregate 
statistics and have normally a huge variation due to measurement error. In addition weights are not easily 
calculated due to negative wealth holdings of some households.  
32 Although there are difference in the chosen sample, the results are roughly in line with Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2006, p. 27).   
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at age 65. However both corrected mean and median saving rates show a much steeper decline for 
ages 90+. The difference in mean and median saving rates is presented in figure 7.  
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age
diff. mean saving rate diff. median saving rate
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008; weighted.
 
 
The differences between the corrected and uncorrected saving rates are substantial and increase 
with age. The difference in mean (median) saving rates at age 80 is 3.3pp (4.3pp), and increases to 
4.7pp (4.0pp) at age 85, 5.4pp (9.4pp) at age 90, and even more for age 90+. The strong effect for the 
age group 90+ comes from the strong increase of the fraction of institutionalized from 18.5% at age 
90, to 32.2% at age 95. Excluding the institutionalized from the sample leads to an implausible in-
crease in saving rates for ages 90+. If institutionalized households are included, the negative trend of 
the saving rates over age continues. To sum up, excluding institutionalized households as done be-
fore in many studies (table 1) leads to a serious and increasingly overestimation of aggregate saving 
rates over age.  
 
7  The German case 
After the investigation of U.S. data, the question arises whether the results carry over to other 
countries with positive saving rates in old-age. This section focuses on Germany, one of the countries 
with the highest saving rates in old-age among the countries introduced in section 2. One has to be 
very cautious to carry over the results from the USA since the institutional background differs for  
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these two countries significantly. Since no German dataset is available to investigate directly saving 
rates in old-age including nursing home residents, this section estimates the corrected saving rates 
based on different data sources. Section 7.1 presents the institutional backgrounds related to long-
term care, how long-term care is financed, and how individual nursing home expenses are calculated 
over all federal states in Germany. Section 7.2 introduces the German Income and Expenditure Sur-
vey (EVS), on which the later investigation is based. Section 7.3 displays the calculation step by step 
and provides the results. The ongoing aging of the population and the therefore related increase of 
the institutionalized population might amplify the results in future decades. Section 7.4 quantifies 
the effects of the demographic development on aggregate saving rates, if institutionalized individuals 
are not sampled.  
 
7.1  Long-term  care  in  Germany:  population  characteristics  and  institu-
tional background  
7.1.1  Resident characteristics   
As in the USA, the fraction of population in nursing homes increases almost exponentially with 
age in Germany. According to the care statistics of the statistical office, in age group 60-65 less than 
1% of individuals live in nursing homes (figure 8). Of age group 80-85 around 7% live in a nursing 
home, and the probability of long-term care in a nursing home reaches around 30% for the oldest 
age group of 90 and above. Especially for the oldest two age groups, the fraction of institutionalized 
people increased from 1999 to 2007.  
The vast majority of the nursing home population is made up of women: in 2003, for example, 
78% of the nursing home inhabitants are female and 22% male (Pflegestatistik 2003: Pflege im Rah-
men der Pflegeversicherung – Deutschlandergebnisse, table 1.1). Only a minority of the institutional-
ized population actually has a partner: in 2003, 8.7% of the inhabitants are married or live in a part-
nership, while 65.7% are widowed, 6.6% divorced, and 18.9% single (Mikrozensus, 2003). Roughly 
speaking, the resident characteristics are similar to the USA. The main difference is the higher frac-
tion of women in German nursing homes. Table 10 shows gender and marital status of nursing home 
residents in 1999 and 2003.   
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Figure 8: Institutionalized population by age group in Germany 
 
Source: Care statistic (Pflegestatistik) of the statistical office for the years 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007. 
The care statistic includes only individuals who receive payments of the long-term care insurance (care-level I, II, 
and III). Individuals living in a nursing home of care-level “0” are not included. The official numbers are correct-
ed by including individuals of care-level “0”, who live in nursing homes. The correction is based on a survey of 
nursing home residents in 2005 conducted by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung.   
 
Table 10: Gender and marital status of nursing home residents in 1999 and 2003 
Mikrozensus 1999
gender single married total
male 81.2% 18.8% 100.0%
female 95.4% 4.6% 100.0%
total 92.4% 7.6% 200.0%
single married total total*
male 17.0% 3.9% 20.9% 21.1%
female 75.5% 3.6% 79.1% 78.9%
total 92.4% 7.6% 100.0% 100.0%     
Mikrozensus 2003
single married total
male 77.9% 22.1% 100.0%
female 94.9% 5.1% 100.0%
total 91.3% 8.7% 100.0%
single married total total**
male 16.4% 4.7% 21.1% 22.0%
female 74.9% 4.0% 78.9% 78.0%
total 91.3% 8.7% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Mikrozensus 1999 and 2003; *Pflegestatistik 1999; **Pflegestatistik 2003. 
 
7.1.2  How is long-term care financed? 
All individuals in nursing homes have to pay their own expenses if they can afford it. The expenses 
are partly covered if the recipient is classified under one of three levels of care granted under long-
term care insurance. The benefit is € 1,023 per month for care level one, € 1,279 for care level two, 
and € 1,432 for care level three.
33 Around 90% of the German population are covered under the so-
cial long-term care insurance, which is currently financed (2011) via a contribution rate of 1.95% of 
                                                           
33 Since the introduction of benefits for nursing home residents from the long-term care insurance in July 1996, 
the benefits remained unchanged until June 2008. This time-span covers the complete period of investigation.  
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gross income for individuals with children and 2.2% without children up to a certain income thresh-
old. Mainly higher income earners and civil servants, who are not part of the social insurance system, 
are obliged to purchase equivalent private long-term care insurance. Health expenditures are cov-
ered by the social health care insurance for the same 90%. Buying an additional long-term care insur-
ance to pay part of the costs not covered by the public long-term care insurance is possible, but plays 
a minor role in the current financing of nursing home expenses.
34 If a nursing home inhabitant is not 
able to cover the net expenses (after the payment of private or social long-term care insurance is 
subtracted) out of his or her disposable income or wealth, children have to step in. They are obliged
35 
to pay the costs not covered from their current income or wealth after an amount retained for their 
own necessities is subtracted. Social assistance, which is funded by general taxation, contributes to 
the funding of long-term care if none of the above mentioned sources are available. The main differ-
ence in financing long-term care between the USA and Germany is the relatively generous benefit of 
the long-term care insurance, which is not means-tested and reduces the individuals’ nursing home 
expenses significantly.   
 
7.1.3  Costs of long-term care in nursing homes 
Nursing home expenses are split into three parts: payment for care depending on the care level 
needed, costs for board and lodgings, and investments. The statistical office published the daily rates 
for care as well as board and lodgings costs in their care statistic for the years 1999, 2001, 2003, 
2005, and 2007. Investment expenses rely on the PAULA data base of the BKK-Bundesverband. Table 
11 reports the average monthly nursing home expenses per resident over all federal states, gross as 
well as net of the benefit paid by the long-term care insurance. Appendix 7 describes in detail how 
the expenses are calculated. Since the later analysis focuses on the years 1998 and 2003, only the 
results for 1999 and 2003 are reported.  
 
                                                           
34 Only 1% of the population have a voluntary private complementary long-term care insurance (OECD, 2005). 
35 § 1601 BGB.  
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Table 11: Average gross and net nursing home expenses per resident and month by fed-
eral state 
federal state overall gross costs overall net costs overall gross costs overall net costs
Baden-Württemberg 2,470 1,338 2,662 1,535
Bavaria 2,337 1,189 2,585 1,446
Berlin 2,417 1,271 2,624 1,477
Brandenburg 1,923 771 2,129 934
Bremen 2,536 1,384 2,733 1,576
Hamburg 2,649 1,521 2,766 1,640
Hesse 2,648 1,491 2,610 1,469
Meckl. Western Pomerania 1,822 656 1,938 760
Lower Saxony 2,372 1,221 2,484 1,348
Northrhine-Westphalia 2,626 1,476 2,693 1,561
Rhineland Palatinate 2,452 1,311 2,445 1,322
Saarland 2,430 1,303 2,452 1,336
Saxony 1,872 778 1,973 814
Saxony-Anhalt 1,903 751 2,159 973
Schleswig-Holstein 2,256 1,127 2,648 1,519
Thuringia 1,749 701 1,988 831
Germany 2,365 1,214 2,526 1,392
1999 2003
 
Source: Care statistic (Pflegestatistik) of the statistical office for the years 1999 and 2003. Additional sources are 
the PAULA data base of the BKK-Bundesverband and Schneekloth (2006) as described in Appendix 7. 
 
The average gross nursing home expenses are € 2,365 in 1999 and € 2,526 in 2003, while net ex-
penses are much lower: € 1,214 in 1999 and € 1,392 in 2003. Net costs differ a lot between federal 
states, ranging from € 656 in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to € 1,521 in Hamburg in 1999. Thus, 
it is important to take the variation between federal states into account.  
 
7.2  The German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) 
Of all available datasets, the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) is the most suitable to 
calculate saving rates in old-age. Appendix 8 argues why other German datasets, where calculations 
of saving rates are possible, are less appropriate. The EVS is supposed to be representative for the 
German population, although the institutionalized population is not sampled and in addition, the 
Federal Statistical Office excludes households above an upper income threshold.
36 The latter re-
striction, however, can be expected to have a small effect on the estimation of saving profiles among 
retired households (Sommer, 2005, 2008). The EVS started in 1962 and since 1973 is conducted every 
five years. The analysis is restricted to the years 1998 and 2003, since the introduction of the German 
                                                           
36 The threshold of net monthly income is € 17,895 in 1998 and € 18,000 in 2003.   
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social long-term care insurance in 1995/1996 changed the way long-term care is financed. This rules 
out the survey years from 1993 backwards.  
In the EVS, savings can be measured in two ways: as the sum of savings flows to and from certain 
asset categories and as the difference between income and consumption. Since the EVS is cross-
sectional, changes in the level of wealth can only be calculated using a synthetic panel. I rely on sav-
ings calculated as the sum of savings flows since this measure is closest to the aggregate statistic of 
the German Bundesbank.
37 In contrast to the analysis of HRS data, this measure captures only active 
savings. All 42,744 (49,720) households available in 2003 (1998) are included in the analysis. The 
results are weighted using the official EVS weights for Germany.  
 
7.3  Do nursing home residents matter? The calculation of corrected saving 
rates 
A three-steps procedure is used to calculate the corrected average saving rates: first, different 
measures of saving rates over the life-cycle are calculated based on the EVS 1998 and 2003; second, 
it is quantified how much of average nursing home expenses is covered by current income; third, 
corrected mean aggregate saving rates are calculated based on the fraction of the population in nurs-
ing homes for each year of age.  
Aggregate saving rates are calculated for each of the measures introduced in subsection 6.1 and 
all ages separately to get an impression of saving rates in the EVS in 1998 and 2003. Appendix 9 
shows scatter plots of the obtained saving rates and describes the smoothing of the saving rates over 
age. The smoothed saving rates over age for each of the three measures are plotted in figure 9. Both 
cross sectional saving patterns of 1998 and 2003 have a hump-shape profile over the life-cycle. How-
ever, the saving rates do not become negative in old-age. The ratio of medians or the median of indi-
vidual changes, which show very similar profiles over the life-cycle, do not decrease further from a 
certain point in retirement on. The ratio of median saving rates even increases again during retire-
ment. These results are in line with Börsch-Supan et al. (2003), which use the EVS from 1978-1993.  
                                                           
37 According to the German Bundesbank, the aggregate saving rate of private households was 10.1% in 1998 
and 10.3% in 2003 compared to 11.1% in 1998 and 12.0% in 2003 based on EVS data.   
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Source: own calculation based on the EVS 2003; Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing.
Kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5.
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Source: own calculation based on the EVS 1998; Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing.
Kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5.
Smoothed saving rates - 1998
 
 
The next step is to estimate mean saving, mean income, and mean saving rates for the institu-
tionalized population. The nursing home population is expected to be a selective sample of the whole 
population:  in  the USA,  for  example  the  risk of  institutionalization  is  higher  among  low  income 
households  (Börsch-Supan,  1989).  To  partly  capture  this  effect,  the  sample  is  split  according  to 
household composition.
38 As seen in section 7.1.1, 78% of the nursing home population in 2003 is 
made up of females and 22% of males (care statistics 2003). In addition, 8.7% of the residents are 
married (Mikrozensus, 2003). Based on these fractions, the sample is split into three parts: single 
females, single males, and married individuals. The same is done for 1998.
39 Net household income is 
equivalised dividing household income by the square root of household size. Subsequently, the indi-
vidual cost of a nursing home stay is subtracted according to the federal state the individual lives in 
(see Appendix 7).
40 Moreover, additional expenses not covered by the nursing home are subtracted 
(e.g. additional payments for medication, clothes, cigarettes, alcohol, newspaper, …). The calculation 
is based on the EVS and separately done for each age. E.g. for all ages above 85, the average addi-
tional expenses are € 207 per month in 2003 and € 138 per month in 1998 based on conservative 
                                                           
38 Single females have lower income compared to single males or couples. If the constructed nursing home 
population consists of a high fraction of females, this translates automatically in a lower average income of the 
nursing home population.  
39 For 1998 there exists no care statistic. The closest care statistic is from 1999. The marital status of an 
individual is not surveyed in the care statistic, therefore the exclusive reports about individuals in need of care 
of the federal statistical office is used. The bold numbers in table 10 show the fractions of the three groups in 
1999 and 2003.  
40 The nursing home expenses of 1999 are inflation adjusted to obtain the expenses at the level of 1998. The 
inflation adjustment is based on the average price development of nursing home prices (cost of care + board 
and lodging) between 1999 and 2007 of 1.27%.  
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estimates.
41 If there is income left after the subtraction of expenses, it is assumed that all the money 
is saved. If nursing home expenses exceed net income, wealth has to be decumulated.  
It is central for the results that the nursing home residents have enough wealth to dissave. Ap-
pendix 10 shows mean and median total net wealth over the three socio-demographic groups and 
age 65 to 85, restricted to those households for whom expenses exceed their current income. It turns 
out that even single females with the lowest incomes and who are decumulating their wealth still 
have a median net wealth of at least € 10,000 and a mean net wealth of at least € 50,000.  
For each year of birth, mean income and the newly constructed mean saving are calculated for all 
three socio-demographic groups (single females and males, married individuals) separately. As there 
is some variation in the data on a yearly basis, the same technique applied before to the saving rates 
is used to smooth the observations over the life-cycle. The oldest observed individual in the EVS is 85 
years old, so that no values are observed from age 86 on. The smoothed value of age 85 is plugged in 
for every year until age 95 since just for these ages nursing home residents become more and more 
relevant. Afterwards mean income and mean saving are combined for each year of age, weighting 
each of the three groups according to their relative size compared to the total nursing home popula-
tion. This procedure ensures that more low income households are represented in the constructed 
nursing home population since the mean income of single females is below the mean income of sin-
gle males, as well as that of married individuals. Figure 10 displays the combined mean income and 
saving for the constructed nursing home population from age 60 to 85.  
The construction of the mean income and saving for the institutionalized population incorporates 
the known information about the institutionalized population (age, federal state, care level, gender, 
and marital status). However, since all the other characteristics are unobserved, the implicit assump-
tion made is that the institutionalized population corresponds to the non-institutionalized population 
with respect to the unobserved characteristics.  
 
                                                           
41 Since to the knowledge of the author there is no source of information what a nursing home resident 
consumes in addition to the expenses for the nursing home, the following procedure was chosen to estimate 
the  additional  expenses.  The  estimates  are  based  on  the  detailed  consumption  diary  of  the  non-
institutionalized population in the EVS. For each year of age all consumption categories are added, which are 
not covered by the nursing home and still needed by a nursing home resident. This includes clothes, health 
care expenses financed by own means, haircuts, items of body care, telephone, radio, TV, radio (and television) 
license fee and related repairs, alcohol (only available in 2003), and tobacco (only available in 2003). The 
quarterly amount is transformed into a monthly amount and adjusted by household size (square root). The 
mean consumption values are smoothed over age using a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing. To 
obtain a conservative estimate the lower bound of the 95% interval is taken. Since I have only observations up 
to age 85, the value for age 85 is carried forward up to age 95+.   
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 90% confidence interval   mean income 
 smoothed mean income 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5, pwidth = 2.63
Source: Own calculation based on the EVS 2003.
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 90% confidence interval   mean income 
 smoothed mean income 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5, pwidth = 2.73
Source: Own calculation based on the EVS 1998.
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 90% confidence interval   mean saving 
 smoothed mean saving 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5, pwidth = 2.62
Source: Own calculation based on the EVS 2003.
































60 65 70 75 80 85
age
 90% confidence interval   mean saving 
 smoothed mean saving 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5, pwidth = 3.09
Source: Own calculation based on the EVS 1998.
Local polynomial smooth - combined mean saving 1998
 
 
The low or even negative mean saving of the constructed nursing home population is in line with 
previous findings. Spieß and Wagner (1993) clarify this point using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) in 1992.
42 They conclude that more than 50% of singles aged 60 years 
and older in West Germany and 80% in East Germany are not able to cover nursing home expenses 
after disposable income and the contributions of the long-term care insurance are taken into ac-
count. For married individuals the percentage is lower (15% in West Germany and 49% in East Ger-
many). This is supported when looking at the nursing home inhabitants who are able to finance their 
expenses fully on their own. Krug and Reh (1992) find that only 33% were able to finance their nurs-
ing home by their own means in 1988.
43 New data from 2005 delivers additional evidence (Schneek-
loth, 2006). Considering the payments of the social long-term care insurance, 36% of the nursing 
                                                           
42 The social long-term care insurance came into effect on the January, 1
st in 1995. Spieß and Wagner (1993) 
include the planed payments of social long-term care insurance in their analysis.  
43 The fraction seems to be relatively low. This could be due to the fact that the social long-term care insurance 
was implemented not until 1995/1996.   
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home population in need of long-term care drew on social assistance in 2005 and were not able to 
pay fully for all expenses.  
Finally, the corrected aggregate mean saving rates including the nursing home population can be 
constructed.
44 For each age t, the corrected aggregate saving rate is calculated as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
1 1 _ 1 1 0 _
1 1 _ 1 1 0 _
_
t t t t
t t t t
t resident prob resident income mean resident prob resident income mean
resident prob resident saving mean resident prob resident saving mean
rate saving
= = + = - × =
= = + = - × =
=  
where resident=0 indicates the non-institutionalized population and resident=1 indicates the con-
structed institutionalized population. The construction of the weights (fraction of households with at 
least one institutionalized member: prob(resident=1)t) consists of two steps: first, the care statistics 
provide the fraction of institutionalized individuals in brackets including 5 years of age. To obtain the 
fraction of institutionalized individuals for each age separately a controlled remote data processing 
was performed;
45 second, the care statistic is on an individual basis and not on a household basis. 
Since income and savings are measured on a household level, the ratios of institutionalization are as 
well transformed to a household level.  
The corrected and uncorrected aggregate mean saving rate are displayed in figure 11. This is done 
for each age from age 20 to 94. The highest age category summarizes all ages from age 95 on since 
the population size is only available for age class 95+. As can be seen, the difference in the corrected 
and uncorrected aggregate mean saving rate becomes apparent from age 75 on. The difference in-
creases from 1.6pp (1.0pp) at age 80, to 3.3pp (3.0pp) at age 85, to 6.0pp (5.7pp) at age 90, up to 
7.4pp (7.1pp) for age 95+ in 2003 (1998). The increase of the corrected saving rate from age 94 to 
age 95+ comes from the fact that the fraction of institutionalized is higher among individuals aged 94 
compared to individuals aged 95+.   
                                                           
44 The analysis is restricted to the construction of the corrected aggregate mean saving rates. The chosen 
procedure is not able to calculate the corrected aggregate median saving rates. The procedure constructs the 
institutionalized population out of the observed population by taking mean income and saving over three 
different groups. Taking the median income and saving is possible, but this biases the construction of the 
corrected median saving rate since the constructed institutionalized population has only one value for income 
and saving, namely the combined median value over the three groups.  
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Overall, the difference in the mean saving rate is comparable to the USA. And this despite the re-
duction of net expenses due to the social long-term care insurance in Germany. The social long-term 
care insurance came into effect in 1995/1996. One of the main reasons for the introduction of the 
social long-term care insurance was the concern about the financial burden of nursing home resi-
dents and their families. Since a large fraction of the nursing home residents had to rely at least part-
ly on social assistance (Krug and Reh, 1992), the financial costs for social assistance increased, which 
had to be paid by the municipalities. The following calculations quantify the effect of the social long-
term insurance on saving rates. Mean saving rates over age are calculated without any support of the 
long-term care insurance. The results are displayed in figure 12.  
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It can be seen that corrected saving rates turn highly negative in old-age. The corrected saving 
rates without long-term care benefits are 2.5pp (2.7pp) lower at age 75 compared to the uncorrected 
saving rates without long-term care benefits. The difference increases to 28pp (32pp) at age 90.  
To sum up, including institutionalized individuals makes a difference in calculating aggregate sav-
ing rates for Germany. The differences in aggregate mean saving rates make up 7pp for the oldest 
age group 95+. The difference is reduced through the benefits of the social long-term care insurance. 
Without the social long-term care insurance saving rates in old-age would even become negative in 
old-age. The long-term care expenditure risk is lowered significantly by the German long-term care 
insurance. 
 
7.4  Influence of an aging society on aggregate saving rates 
Using Germany as an example, this subsection quantifies the effect of the ongoing aging process 
of industrialized populations with respect to the nursing home population on saving rates. If one 
assumes that the fraction of institutionalized individuals for every year of age stays constant,
46 the 
difference in the saving rates in old-age should remain the same holding all the other factors con-
stant. 
The main influence of population aging is on the aggregate saving rate including all ages. This is 
due to the fact that older age groups increase their relative weight, e.g. according to the 12
th coordi-
nated population forecasting of the federal statistical office the fraction of age group 80-84 increases 
from 1.6% in 1999 to 6.4% in 2050 and the fraction of age group 90-94 increases from 0.5% in 1999 
to 2.5% in 2050 (figure 13).  
                                                           
46 There are two effects working in opposite directions: First, medical progress could increase the number of 
healthy years, delaying the entry into a nursing home to older ages (Rothgang, 2001). Second, more single 
households, less children per parent, and higher disability rates among younger cohorts could reduce the age 
at which individuals enter a nursing home (Lakdawalla et al., 2003; Schnabel, 2007, p. 15). Schnabel (2007) 
forecasts the frequency of long-term care rates for Germany on constant prevalence rates. Augurzky et al. 
(2007, p. 58) use constant fractions of individuals in nursing home per age group as their reference category to 
calculate the demand for long-term care in nursing homes. Comparing the care statistic of 1999 and 2007, up 
to age 85 the fraction of institutionalized individuals remains almost constant. Above 85, there is an increase in 
the fraction of institutionalized from 1999 to 2007.   
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Figure 13: Estimated fraction of the oldest old on the total population over time 
 
Source: own calculations based on the results of the 12
th coordinated population forecasting (31.12.2008). As-
sumptions according to the lower bound of the middle scenario (scenario 1-W1). 
 
Figure 14: Fraction of the institutionalized population on the total population 
 
Source: own calculations based on the results of the 12
th coordinated population forecasting (31.12.2008) and 
the care statistics of 1999 and 2007.  
 
Overall the number of nursing home residents will increase from 0.7% in 1999 to 2.9% in 2050 
(figure 14). This corresponds to 1,995,000 nursing home residents in 2050 (the forecasts are close to 
the calculation of Enste and Pimpertz (2008) based on the 11
th coordinated population forecasting 
and the care statistic of 2005).  
To quantify the effect of an increasing nursing home population on the aggregate saving rate, the 
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where the aggregate saving rate is the weighted sum of the saving rates for each age. The initial age 
is set to 20 since the household head must be at least 20 years old in the EVS. The summation ends 
at the age category 95+. The weights for each age correspond to the relative population size at each 
age t. The saving rates for each age t are assumed to be the same compared to the results obtained 
from the EVS in 1998 or 2003. Only the weights for each age change over time according to the 12
th 
coordinated population forecasting. Aggregate saving rates are calculated based on the population 
forecast of k=2010, 2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050. Finally, the difference between the corrected and 
uncorrected aggregate saving rate is taken and displayed in figure 15.  
 
Figure 15: Difference between the corrected and uncorrected aggregate saving rates 
 
Source: own calculations based on the results of the 12
th coordinated population forecasting (31.12.2008), the 
care statistics of 1999 and 2003, and the EVS 1998 and 2003.  
 
Overall, the difference increases over time, which reflects the higher fraction of elderly, who 
move at a constant rate into a nursing home. The difference between the aggregate saving rates is 
only 0.20 percentage points in 1999 and 0.26pp in 2003. The difference increases to 0.70pp based on 
the EVS 1998 and 0.81pp based on the EVS 2003 in the year 2050. Thus, the consequences of the 
nursing home population on aggregate saving rates seem to be limited. However, one has to keep in 
mind that the results are based on old-age incomes, benefits of the long-term care insurance, and  
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nursing home expenses as in 1998/ 2003. If future old-age income declines in real terms, benefits of 
the long-term care insurance are less generous
47, and nursing home expenses increase stronger than 
old-age income, the gap between the corrected and uncorrected aggregate saving rates will increase 
even further. The estimates in this paper, furthermore, are likely to be only a lower bound, as all 
individuals in need for long-term care receiving ambulant treatment are not explicitly considered 
here, and individuals, who receive ambulant care, are most likely to be underrepresented in the EVS. 
The costs for ambulant care can be almost as high as those for the care in nursing homes, which 
leads to an increase of the estimated effect.  
 
8  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the saving puzzle in old-age. Almost all empir-
ical investigations in many countries reveal positive or at least close to zero saving rates in old-age. 
Many suggestions were made to find an explanation for these empirical facts. An often mentioned 
but never investigated conceptual aspect of the estimation of saving rates in old-age is that institu-
tionalized individuals, especially the nursing home population, are not sampled in almost all studies. 
This paper sheds more light on the effect of the exclusion of institutionalized individuals in estimating 
saving rates over old-age. Particularly this group is expected to decumulate wealth since nursing 
home expenses net of private (and public) insurance exceed disposable income on average. This pa-
per quantifies this effect using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the USA and the Income 
and Expenditure Survey (EVS) for Germany. 
Evidence in the USA suggests that nursing home residents are key components in understanding 
the saving behavior in old-age. In the USA, a representative single depletes his or her wealth almost 
completely over a two-year period based on the ratio of medians measure. It takes less than 7 years 
if dissaving is measured via the median of individual changes and 11 years for the ratio of means. For 
couples, wealth reduction is not that large. The strong dissaving and the low median wealth holdings 
are at least partly responsible why 35% (2004) of all nursing home expenses have to be financed by 
Medicaid, which supports individuals and families who cannot afford living in a nursing home any 
more. Since the nursing home population almost increases exponentially with age and reaches more 
than 30% at age 95+ for USA, leaving out nursing home residents leads to a serious overestimation of 
                                                           
47 Due to the aging of the population, the number of nursing home residents increases. Because social long-
term care benefits are financed by a pay-as-you-go system, real social long-term care benefits have to decrease 
to prevent that insurance contributions increase. Since the introduction of the long-term care insurance in 
1996 until 2008, there was no increase of benefits for nursing home care.  
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the saving rates in old-age. In the USA, not including the institutionalized households leads to an 
overestimation of the mean (median) saving rates of 3.3pp (4.3pp) at age 80, 5.4pp (9.4pp) at age 90 
and even more for age 90+.  
Based on detailed calculations using the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) and other 
data sources, the overestimation of the German mean saving rate increases to around 6pp at age 90. 
Therefore, the overestimation of saving rates is not restricted to the USA.  
This study helps to explain the high saving rates in old-age found in many countries and adds fur-
ther credibility to an extended LCH-PIH model, which includes a precautionary saving motive with 
respect to nursing home risk. The ongoing aging of the industrialized populations and the connected 
increase in the fraction of the nursing home population will strengthen the importance of including 
the nursing home population to estimate saving rates in micro empirical studies. Based on calcula-
tions for Germany, not including the institutionalized population results in an overestimation of the 
aggregate saving rate over all ages of 0.2pp in 1999 and will increase to around 0.7-0.8pp in the year 
2050. To sum up, more effort should be put in the collection of data including nursing home resi-
dents over different countries as done in the HRS. Leaving them out could lead to serious biases as 
pointed out in this paper based on the saving rate.  
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9  Appendix 
Appendix 1: Concepts to measure saving 
 
Three methods of calculating saving in period t are introduced since they are used by the studies 
introduced in section 2 and two of these methods are used in this study as well.
48 For a detailed de-
scription of concepts and measurement of household saving rates see Brugiavini and Weber (2003). 
1.  savingt = assetst – assetst-1  
2.  savingt = incomet – consumptiont (often called residual measure) 
3.  savingt = inflowst – outflowst of the wealth account 
Most studies introduced in section 2 use method 1 and/or 2 to calculate saving in period t. Each of 
these two methods has certain advantages and disadvantages.  
·  Consumption measures are often based on recall (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2009). The longer 
the recall period, the larger the recall bias. Overall consumption seems to be underreported. 
In addition, there is evidence that income is underreported as well. However, the mismeas-
urement is more severe related to consumption (Brandolini and Cannari, 1994).   
·  Wealth holdings are also measured with error. Frick et al. (2007, figures 8, 13) report that fi-
nancial wealth is underestimated in survey data. Debt and real estate seems to reflect aggre-
gate numbers very well. Juster, Smith, and Stafford (1999, pp. 257, 260) point out that the 
number of categories for different asset groups influences overall wealth holdings positively.  
·  The change in wealth measure includes active and passive saving. The residual saving meas-
ure includes only active savings and does not include capital gains and losses.
49  
·  The income minus consumption measure does not take into account inheritances. Inter vivos 
transfers received should be included in the income measure, and inter vivos transfers given 
away should be part of the consumption measure, which is the case e.g. in the HRS. 
 
                                                           
48 More details about the implemented saving measures are provided in section 6 and 7. 
49  The  difference  between  measures  including  only  active  saving  and  measures  including  both  active  and 
passive saving could be large due to drastic price changes of assets like stocks or real estate.   
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Appendix 2: Sample restrictions 
 
Table 12: Sample restrictions 
wave (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 12,652 12,652 0 0 0 0
2 19,642 19,642 0 0 0 0
3 17,991 17,991 17,991 8,353 6,502 0
4 21,384 21,384 21,384 10,790 8,275 6,396
5 19,579 19,579 19,579 10,736 8,238 8,030
6 18,167 18,166 18,166 10,939 8,375 8,054
7 20,129 20,129 20,129 11,111 8,473 8,223
8 18,469 18,469 18,469 11,391 8,710 8,435
9 17,217 17,217 17,217 11,344 8,615 8,285
total 165,230 165,229 132,935 74,664 57,188 47,423
respondents households
 
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 1992-2008. 
 
(1)  Include all respondents from wave 1 to 9. 
(2)  Exclude hhidpn==22965041 & wave==6: no strata and weights. 
(3)  Exclude waves 1 and 2 due to the availability of a consistent nursing home status (available 
from 1996 on) and a underreporting of AHEAD respondents’ wealth in 1994. 
(4)  Exclude all respondents below 65 years of age at the time of interview. 
(5)  Restrict to household level data.  
(6)  Keep only households, which are observed in two subsequent years. 
 
Appendix 3: Weighting 
 
The HRS oversamples Black and Hispanic HRS respondents as well as the number of HRS respond-
ents who are residents of the state of Florida. Household weights are constructed in a way to have 
the sum of the weights equal the number of households in the population as measured by the March 
Current  Population  Survey,  which  includes  living,  non-institutionalized  respondents.  A  household 
where the only or both respondents are institutionalized, e.g., living in a nursing home at the time of 
the interview, will have zero household weights for that wave. Since the institutionalized population 
is the core of this analysis, a way suggested by the HRS staff is to use the weights from the wave prior 
to institutionalization.
50 This procedure assures that almost all households  have positive weights 
                                                           
50 The same approach is chosen by Hurd and Rohwedder (2010).   
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since nursing home residents are originally not sampled. For 2000 and 2002 additional weights for 
the institutionalized population are provided. Unfortunately, the weights are only available on an 
individual level in these two years. This means that these weights cannot be used to consistently 
weight the sample on a household level from 1996-2008. For further information about weighting 
please  consult  the  HRS  homepage  (http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/index.php?p=weightinfo).  If 
weights are used, there is a very limited number of observations (15) where the household has no 
positive weight before observed as institutionalized household. 
 
Appendix 4: Item-nonresponse 
 
Table 13: Item-nonresponse by wealth category 
non-institutionalized institutionalized non-institutionalized institutionalized
obs 54,365 2,823 54,365 2,823
Value of primary residence Value of CD, government savings bonds, and T-bills
continuous value 62.1 17.5 17.5 8.9
no asset 24.3 73.8 70.51 80.27
required imputation 13.6 8.7 12.0 10.9
Net value of real estate (not primary residence) Net value of bonds and bond funds
continuous value 10.3 3.9 4.3 2.3
no asset 84.8 92.7 90.0 90.9
required imputation 4.9 3.4 5.7 6.8
Net value of vehicles Net value of all other savings
continuous value 57.7 13.0 8.9 3.5
no asset 22.7 81.1 85.6 91.9
required imputation 19.6 5.9 5.5 4.6
Net value of businesses Value of all mortgages (primary residence)
continuous value 4.4 1.3 14.7 1.9
no asset 91.7 96.2 81.1 94.4
required imputation 3.9 2.5 4.3 3.7
Net value of IRA, Keogh accounts Value of other home loans (primary residence)
continuous value 20.5 3.9 4.8 0.4
no asset 67.1 88.6 92.7 96.1
required imputation 12.4 7.6 2.6 3.4
Net value of stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts Value of other debt
continuous value 16.9 7.8 17.0 6.3
no asset 69.5 80.7 78.3 88.5
required imputation 13.7 11.5 4.8 5.2
Value of checking, savings, or money market accounts
continuous value 58.2 41.3
no asset 15.3 36.4
required imputation 26.5 22.2  
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008.  
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Appendix 5: Wealth changes of nursing home residents by wave and age class  
 
Figure 16 presents the change in wealth over a two-year period for single nursing home residents 
and nursing home residents with a spouse. The change in wealth is measured according the three 
measures introduced in subsection 6.1 and displayed for each wave and age class. Table 14 presents 
the number of observations in each age class. The first age class includes all ages from 65-79 to ob-
tain a reasonable sample size. Contrary to singles, most nursing home residents with a spouse are in 
the lowest age class.  
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Overall, the three measures of two-year percent change in wealth of institutionalized individuals 
seem to be quite stable for singles by both wave and age class. For couples, the ratio of means and 
medians are less stable by wave and age class. The mean of individual changes is more stable. The 




Table 14: Household composition of the institutionalized population by age class 
age obs in % obs in % obs in %
65-79 439 21% 194 46% 633 25%
80-84 382 18% 89 21% 471 18%
85-89 599 28% 98 23% 697 27%
90-94 481 23% 38 9% 519 20%
95+ 222 10% 7 2% 229 9%
total 2,123 100% 426 100% 2,549 100%
all households singles  couples
 
Source: own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008.   
  45
Appendix 6: Saving rates for each age and smoothing plots - HRS 
 
Saving rates are smoothed over age to reduce the variance and to obtain an easy to interpret in-
formation structure. The reduction of the variance results in a higher bias. This means a bias/variance 
tradeoff is inherent in smoothing. The chosen smoothing procedure is the kernel-weighted local pol-
ynomial smoothing (see Stata base reference manual, vol. 2, I-P, release 10, p. 206-215 and the ref-
erences  therein).  The  chosen  specification  of  the  smoothing  procedure  is  displayed  below  each 
graph.  
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 90% confidence interval   mean saving rate 
 smoothed mean saving rate 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5, pwidth = 13.72
Source: Own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008; weighted.
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age
 90% confidence interval   median saving rate 
 smoothed median saving rate 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5, pwidth = 4.57
Source: Own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008; weighted.
Local polynomial smooth - median saving rate
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 90% confidence interval   mean saving rate 
 smoothed mean saving rate 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5, pwidth = 8.81
Source: Own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008; weighted.
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 90% confidence interval   median saving rate 
 smoothed median saving rate 
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 1, bandwidth = 5, pwidth = 4.84
Source: Own calculation based on the HRS 1996-2008; weighted.




Appendix 7: Calculation of nursing home expenses in Germany 
 
The daily rates for care as well as board and lodgings are taken from the care statistic of the sta-
tistical office in 1999 and 2003. Average investment expenses per resident over all federal states are 
based on the PAULA data base of the BKK-Bundesverband. The daily rates are multiplied by 30.4 to 
obtain average monthly costs. Columns 1-3 of table 15 show the average care expenses depending 
on the care level. Column 4 shows the average care expenses over all care levels, weighted according 
to the fraction of individuals in each care level and federal state.  
Columns 5-7 present the net cost of care after the contribution of the long-term care insurance is 
taken into account. For a few federal states the costs are zero since the contribution of the long-term 
care insurance is larger compared to the average expenses. Moreover, the contribution of the long-
term care insurance is restricted to a maximum of 75% of the total nursing home expenses. Column 8 
displays the weighted average net expenses of care over all care levels. The cost of board and lodging 
can be seen in column 9 and the investment expenses in column 10.
51 Overall net expenses are 
shown in column 11. Column 12 presents overall expenses for individuals of care level “0”. These 
individuals do not get a contribution to their cost of care from the long-term care insurance. The 
costs of care are assumed to be 18.4% below the expenses for care level one (Schneekloth, 2006, p. 
29, table 9.1). Column 13 is the sum of average overall costs including residents of care-level “0”.
52 
Column 14 adds an average extra charge for single rooms.
53  
 
                                                           
51 The average investment costs per person are taken from the PAULA data base of the BKK-Bundesverband. 
Only data for 2003 are available. Thus, to obtain investment expenses for 1999, the 2003 data are inflation 
adjusted assuming the same inflation rate as for the combination of cost of care as well as board and lodging. 
This is equivalent to assuming the investment expenses reflect a constant fraction of the other expenses.  
52 Column 13 is the sum of column 11 multiplied by 92.6% (fraction of care level “I-III”) for the old federal states 
and 96.6% for the newly-formed German states and column 12 times 7.4% (fraction of care level “0”) for the 
old federal states and 3.4% for the newly-formed German states. The fraction of care-level “0“ nursing home 
residents is taken from Schneekloth (2006, p. 10, table 2.1). 
53 To the best of my knowledge, there is no statistic about the additional charge of single rooms in nursing 
homes available. According to experts and inquiries in the internet, the additional charge is set to € 150 in 2003 
and € 141 for 1999. This additional charge is multiplied by the fraction of available single rooms of 55.4% in 
2003 and 45.7% in 1999 (care statistic 1999 and 2003), which is a reasonable assumption since 89.2% (1999) 
and 89.5% (2003) of all places in nursing home are taken. The percentages of nursing home utilization even 
increase if residents of care level “0” are additionally included.   
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Table 15: Calculation of net nursing home costs in Germany 
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Appendix 8: Suitability of other German datasets 
 
The German SAVE study (Sparen und Altersvorsorge in Deutschland) has reached its maximum sample 
size in 2006. However, the sample size is still too small to calculate robust saving rates in old-age (age 65-
69: 313 households; age 70-74: 273 households; age 75-79: 151 households; age 80-84: 67 households; age 
85+: 21 households). No nursing home residents are sampled.  
The German SOEP (Socio-Economic Panel Study) lacks sufficient measures of saving.
54 The question „Do 
you usually have an amount of money left over at the end of the month that you can save for larger pur-
chases, emergency expenses or to acquire wealth? If yes, how much?“ has certain restrictions: first, it asks 
for regular saving, and second, it does not allow dissaving. Net wealth differences over a five year horizon 
(between the surveys 2002 and 2007) can be calculated. The mean net wealth change is negative over all 
age groups. In addition, mean saving rates over age classes fluctuate a lot and are significantly negative for 
age groups below 65. Thus, the measure of net wealth does not seem to be very precise. Nursing home 
residents are originally not sampled. However, individuals are followed if they move into a nursing home. In 
2007, they add up to 42 individuals in a nursing home and 32 individuals in residential homes. The number 
of nursing home residents is clearly too small.  
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) has one possibility to measure saving 
using the wealth difference between wave 1 and 2.
55  Since the individual has to be sampled in both waves, 
the German sample has an insufficient number of observations (age 65-69: 340 households; age 70-74: 212 
households; age 75-79: 146 households; age 80-84: 89 households; age 85+: 35 households). Nursing home 
residents are originally not included in the German sample. Since individuals are followed when moving 
into a nursing home, the second wave of the German sample contains less than 20 nursing home residents 
(depending on the variables to construct nursing home residence). Again the number of observations is by 
far too small. 
                                                           
54 The German SOEP data are provided by German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin).  
55 This analyses uses data from SHARE release 2.3.0, as of November 13th 2009. SHARE data collection in 2004-2007 
was primarily funded by the European Commission through its 5th and 6th framework programmes (project numbers 
QLK6-CT-2001- 00360; RII-CT- 2006-062193; CIT5-CT-2005-028857). Additional funding by the US National Institute on 
Aging (grant numbers U01 AG09740-13S2; P01 AG005842; P01 AG08291; P30 AG12815; Y1-AG-4553-01; OGHA 04-
064;  R21  AG025169)  as  well  as  by  various  national  sources  is  gratefully  acknowledged  (see  http://www.share-
project.org for a full list of funding institutions).  
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Appendix 9: Saving rates for each age and smoothing plots - EVS 
 
Saving rates are smoothed over age to reduce the variance and to obtain an easy to interpret infor-
mation structure. The reduction of the variance results in a higher bias. This means a bias/variance tradeoff 
is inherent in smoothing. The chosen smoothing procedure is the kernel-weighted local polynomial smooth-
ing (see Stata base reference manual, vol. 2, I-P, release 10, p. 206-215 and the references therein). The 
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Local polynomial smooth - median of individal changes 1998
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Appendix 10: Net wealth over age - EVS 
 
For all individuals who are not able to cover net nursing home expenses mean and median net wealth is 
calculated over age. The figures below show smoothed median and mean net wealth over age for single 
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Source: own calculation based on the EVS 2003.
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Source: own calculation based on the EVS 1998.







































60 65 70 75 80 85
age
median mean
Source: own calculation based on the EVS 2003.







































60 65 70 75 80 85
age
median mean
Source: own calculation based on the EVS 1998.
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Source: own calculation based on the EVS 2003.
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